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The Fossil Fuel Industry’s Push to Target 
Climate Protesters in the U.S. 
GRACE NOSEK* 
At the very moment when the United Nations has called for 
profound shifts in social and economic systems to avert climate 
catastrophe, state and non-state actors in the United States (U.S.) are 
using a series of tactics to target and stifle climate protesters. 
Although the move to stifle climate protesters is often framed as a 
government effort, this Article argues it is critical to draw out the role 
of the fossil fuel industry in initiating, amplifying, and supporting 
such tactics. 
This Article highlights the role the fossil fuel industry has played 
in supporting the targeting and restricting of climate protesters in the 
U.S. The strategies for targeting protesters are grouped into three 
broad categories, with each category relying on distinctive legal tools. 
The first category is federal and state legislation that heightens 
penalties for climate protester in myriad ways. The second is the use 
of violence and surveillance against climate protesters by both state 
and non-state actors, which is connected to a rhetorical and legal 
push to label protesters as extremists and terrorists. The third is 
retaliatory lawsuits filed against climate protesters and 
organizations that support climate protests. Although such actions 
often ostensibly target civil disobedience, by imposing immense 
criminal and financial consequences, they threaten to 
unconstitutionally chill lawful, protected protest as well.  
By examining the tactics in concert, it is much easier to see how 
both individual protesters and organizations that support protesters 
might be chilled from participating in lawful climate protest. It is also 
clear that there are important synergistic effects when these tactics are 
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used together, heightening their respective abilities to undermine and 
chill climate protest. A third insight is how difficult it is for climate 
protesters to legally challenge these tactics. Finally, the analysis 
shows the pivotal role fossil fuel industry trade and lobbying groups 
play in targeting climate protesters, highlighting the breadth and 
depth of industry support for such tactics. 
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The United Nations (UN) has warned that governments around 
the world must rapidly decrease greenhouse gas emissions to avoid 
catastrophic climate change, that the window to decrease such 
emissions is closing, and that profound economic and social 
transformation will be needed to achieve such emission reductions.1 
Despite these warnings, between 2015 and 2019, global greenhouse 
gas emissions actually rose.2 Around the world people, particularly 
young people, have mobilized to protest inaction on climate change.3 
Some governments are responding to this mobilization by 
attempting to target climate protesters.4 For example, the London 
Metropolitan Police issued a citywide ban on protests by Extinction 
Rebellion—a movement that uses non-violent civil disobedience to 
advocate for bold climate action5—only to have that ban overturned 
as unlawful;6 Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has 
threatened several times to crack down on protesters who target 
polluting companies;7 French authorities have asked counter-
terrorism units to investigate peaceful acts of civil disobedience by 
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climate activists.8 The Canadian province of Alberta just passed a 
critical infrastructure bill that creates steeper penalties for 
protesters, which was introduced at the height of Indigenous-led 
protests against the Coastal GasLink Pipeline project.9 This is all 
happening within the larger context of governments and businesses 
around the world harassing, silencing, arresting, and even 
murdering environmental defenders.10  
The United States (U.S.) provides an important example of 
recent government efforts to undermine, surveil, and punish climate 
protesters. Non-profit and civil society organizations have raised the 
alarm about a recent nationwide trend to stifle protest more 
generally.11 As of January 2021, the International Center for Not-
For-Profit-Law reported that 146 legal initiatives restricting the 
right to peaceful protest had been considered by 40 states, and 25 of 
those had been enacted since November 2016.12 In 2017, the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression and the UN Special Rapporteur 
on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association 
wrote a letter to the U.S. government highlighting the alarming 
attempt to criminalize peaceful protest.13 The letter noted that many 
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https://www.icnl.org/usprotestlawtracker/ [https://perma.cc/NC38-RQPB]. 
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of the legislative proposals seemed to target environmental 
protesters in particular.14 Politicians, practitioners, and academics 
have echoed this position, arguing that there is a large scale and 
multi-pronged attempt to silence climate protesters in the U.S.15 
In this article, I will highlight the role the fossil fuel industry 
has played in supporting the targeting and restricting of climate 
protesters in the U.S. My analysis will begin with a brief introduction 
of how and why the right to protest is protected under the First 
Amendment. I will also touch on the historical importance of civil 
disobedience and how harsh penalties for civil disobedience may 
stifle lawful protest. Then I will analyze the tactics used to target 
and restrict climate protesters. I have grouped the strategies for 
targeting protesters into three broad categories, with each category 
relying on distinctive legal tools. The first category is federal and 
state legislation that heightens penalties for climate protesters in a 
myriad of ways. The second is the use of violence and surveillance 
against climate protesters by both state and non-state actors, which 
is connected to a rhetorical and legal push to label protesters as 
extremists and terrorists. The third is retaliatory lawsuits filed 
against climate protesters and organizations that support climate 
protests. I will highlight the fossil fuel industry’s role in initiating, 
supporting, or amplifying each of the three strategies.  
By examining these three strategies, we will see four important 
insights. First, when looking at the strategies together, it is evident 
that such tactics may thwart individual protesters and organizations 




df [https://perma.cc/54X9-P236] [hereinafter Letter from the Special 
Rapporteurs]. 
 14. Id. at 18. 
 15. See, e.g., Ben Lefebvre & Anthony Adragna, Trump Administration Seeks 
Criminal Crackdown on Pipeline Protests, POLITICO (June 3, 2019), 
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/06/03/trump-administration-seeks-criminal-
crackdown-on-pipeline-protests-1499008 [https://perma.cc/NM56-JMEM]; Traci 
Yoder, The Attack on Climate Justice Movements, NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD (Mar. 14, 
2019), https://www.nlg.org/the-attack-on-climate-justice-movements/ 
[https://perma.cc/P8XN-8YZT]; Jenna Bitar, 6 Ways Government Is Going After 
Environmental Activists, ACLU (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/free-
speech/rights-protesters/6-ways-government-going-after-environmental-activists 
[https://perma.cc/EP2L-PD8S]; Jenna Ruddock, Coming Down the Pipeline: First 
Amendment Challenges to State-Level “Critical Infrastructure” Trespass Laws, 69 




Second, there are important synergistic effects when these tactics are 
used together, heightening their respective abilities to undermine 
and deter climate protest. For example, one tactic I analyze is how 
state and non-state actors are undertaking expansive surveillance of 
climate protesters. Another key tactic is proposing and passing state 
and federal critical infrastructure provisions that increase penalties 
for climate protesters. Some states are drafting critical 
infrastructure provisions framed in terms of conspiracy, which only 
requires that conspirators take steps towards an unlawful act rather 
than committing an unlawful act. These provisions can thus give law 
enforcement even broader latitude to surveil and arrest climate 
protesters. A third insight is how difficult it is for climate protesters 
to legally challenge these tactics. Governments and industry are 
using their superior resources to adapt as soon as protesters 
successfully challenge their tactics. Finally, we will see the pivotal 
role fossil fuel industry trade and lobbying groups play in creating, 
supporting, and amplifying various tactics to target climate 
protesters.  
Before I begin my analysis, it is important to explain my choice 
of terminology. I am borrowing the International Center for Not-For-
Profit-Law’s definition of restriction, where something restricts 
peaceful protest when it “constrain[s] or narrow[s] the means, 
methods, or venues used by individuals seeking to participate in or 
facilitate a peaceful protest.”16 I also use the word “target” to capture 
tactics that could potentially discourage or stifle climate protesters 
in addition to merely restricting their ability to protest.  
  The targeting and restricting measures in this article are all 
connected to the protest or resistance of oil and gas industry 
infrastructure in some way, as forthcoming analysis makes clear. 
People protest oil and gas infrastructure projects for different 
reasons, including their potential to infringe on Indigenous 
sovereignty and rights, their localized environmental impacts, and 
their contributions to climate change. Because climate change is 
almost always an underlying concern for those resisting oil and gas 
infrastructure projects, for ease of reference, I generally refer to those 
who resist oil and gas infrastructure projects as “climate protesters.” 
However, Indigenous peoples, including those who led the resistance 
 
 16. U.S. Protest Law Tracker Methodology and Key Terms, INT’L CTR. FOR 





to the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL), have strenuously critiqued 
being labelled as protesters, arguing that they are not protesters but 
peaceful defenders of their land.17 Indeed, in a legal challenge, the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe made clear that, although the DAPL did 
not cross its reservation, it was built on what the Tribe considers 
treaty land.18 In this article, I will refer to Indigenous peoples 
resisting oil and gas infrastructure as “water protectors,” since some 
of those leading the resistance have publicly articulated such a 
preference.19   
II. THE RIGHT TO PROTEST UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Before detailing all the tactics U.S. federal and state 
governments have used to restrict and target climate protesters, 
supported by the fossil fuel industry, it is important to understand 
why such targeting of climate protesters might undermine important 
freedom of speech values or even violate the U.S. constitution. 
Drawing from Supreme Court case law, I will briefly detail why and 
to what extent protest is protected in the U.S. As many of the 
restrictions ostensibly target civil disobedience rather than lawful 
protest, I will also demonstrate how harsh punishments for civil 
disobedience might deter lawful protest and undermine important 
freedom of speech values. In the next three sections, I will apply the 
First Amendment analysis to the measures restricting and targeting 
protesters discussed to highlight how certain tactics might raise 
constitutional concerns. Indeed, one such tactic, a series of legislative 
provisions passed by South Dakota, was already enjoined by a 
federal court for infringing on the First Amendment. Ultimately the 
 
17. See, e.g., Allison Herrera, Standing Rock Activists: Don't Call Us 
Protesters. We're Water Protectors, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-10-31/standing-rock-activists-dont-call-us-
protesters-were-water-protectors [https://perma.cc/SJ6G-CNFC]; Iyuskin 
American Horse, ‘We are Protectors, Not Protesters’: Why I'm Fighting the North 
Dakota Pipeline, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/aug/18/north-dakota-pipeline-activists-bakken-oil-fields 
[https://perma.cc/DFZ8-JCM4]. 
18. Elizabeth Bower, Standing Together: How the Federal Government Can 
Protect the Tribal Cultural Resources of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 42 VT. L. 
REV. 605, 607 (2018). 
19. See, e.g., WATER PROTECTOR LEGAL COLLECTIVE, 
https://waterprotectorlegal.org/ [https://perma.cc/E43D-BLK5]; Iyuskin American 




South Dakota government agreed not to enforce the provisions the 
court found problematic.20 My goal is not to argue that each tactic in 
isolation violates the First Amendment, but to outline a pattern of 
activity that, taken together, threatens to profoundly chill free 
speech and democratic engagement in a critical moment for climate 
action. Indeed, some have argued that the intent behind many of 
these tactics is the unconstitutional deterrence of climate protest.21 
This pattern of targeting climate protesters is happening within the 
larger decades-long pattern of the fossil fuel industry actively 
undermining the ability of the public to participate in the climate 
policy debate by manufacturing doubt around climate science.22  
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that political 
speech receives the maximum protection under the First 
Amendment.23 In discussing why political speech receives such 
protection, the Court in Carey v. Brown cited Alexander Meiklejohn, 
stating that “[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political 
discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will 
of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an 
opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a 
fundamental principle of our constitutional system.”24 Political 
speech includes “discussions of candidates, structures and forms of 
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21. Spencer Woodman, Republican Lawmakers in Five States Propose Bills to 
Criminalize Peaceful Protest, THE INTERCEPT (Jan. 19, 2017), 
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/19/republican-lawmakers-in-five-states-
propose-bills-to-criminalize-peaceful-protest/ [https://perma.cc/8NZF-N8Z3]. 
22. Grace Nosek, The Climate Necessity Defense: Protecting Public 
Participation in the U.S. Climate Policy Debate in a World of Shrinking Options, 
49 ENV’T L. 249, 250, 258 (2019); Robert J. Brulle, Institutionalizing Delay: 
Foundation Funding and the Creation of U.S. Climate Change Counter-movement 
Organizations, 122 CLIMATIC CHANGE 681, 692 (2014) [hereinafter Brulle, 
Institutionalizing Delay]; Robert Brulle, The Climate Lobby: A Sectoral Analysis 
of Lobbying Spending on Climate Change in the USA, 2000 to 2016, 149 CLIMATIC 
CHANGE 289, 302 (2018) [hereinafter Brulle, The Climate Lobby]. 
23. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 466–67 (1980); Mills v. Alabama, 
384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) (“Whatever differences may exist about interpretations 
of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that a major 
purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental 
affairs.”). 




government, the manner in which government is operated or should 
be operated, and all such matters relating to political processes.”25 
The Court has also underscored that protest, including public-issue 
picketing, is a key embodiment of protected political speech.26 
Thomas Emerson, a preeminent First Amendment theorist often 
cited by the Supreme Court, argues that robust protections for 
political speech and protest by “radical, unpopular, or 
underprivileged individuals and groups” are absolutely critical 
because “these persons do not normally have access to the mass 
media of communication.”27 The U.S. can only attempt to achieve a 
true marketplace of ideas by ensuring that such groups have robust 
protections for speech, assembly, and protest.28 
In case law arising from the civil rights struggle, the Court built 
on its political speech jurisprudence to articulate what amounts to a 
robust right to protest.29 In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., the 
Court ruled that even if some protesters engaged in acts of violence, 
or other actions not protected by the constitution, “the right to 
associate does not lose all constitutional protection.”30 In other 
words, the violence of some protesters does not remove First 
Amendment protection from the protest as a whole, or those who 
helped organize it. Protest can include “vituperative, abusive, and 
inexact” language, “political hyperbole,” and “vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public 
officials.”31 Additionally, the right to associate is fundamental to the 
right to engage in political expression. In NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. 
Patterson, the Court noted that “[e]ffective advocacy of both public 
and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is 
undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more 
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the 
freedoms of speech and assembly.”32   
However, there are important constraints to the right to protest 
under the First Amendment. In most cases, First Amendment 
 
25. Mills, 384 U.S. at 218–19. 
26. Carey, 447 U.S. at 466–67. 
27. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 286 (1970). 
28. Id. 
29. Richard Blum, Labor Picketing, the Right to Protest, and the Neoliberal 
First Amendment, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 595, 606–07 (2019). 
30. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 908 (1982). 
31. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969). 




protections do not extend to political speech or protest on private 
property.33 Protesters can thus be charged with trespass or other 
crimes for protesting on private property.  
Additionally, the conduct and speech elements of protest are 
protected differently under the First Amendment, with conduct 
receiving less protection.34 Conduct is defined as behavior or action 
outside of pure speech.35 Generally, conduct only receives First 
Amendment protection if the Court determines that it is “expressive 
conduct.”36 To determine if conduct is expressive, the Court asks 
whether said conduct was intended to convey a message, and 
whether there would be a great likelihood an audience would 
understand that message.37 In a series of decisions, the Court held 
that all of the following behavior qualified as expressive conduct: 
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War,38 staging a sit-
in in a “whites only” area to protest segregation,39 wearing American 
military uniforms to critique war policy,40 burning the American flag 
to protest the policies of an executive administration,41 and picketing 
to protest a diverse array of causes.42 In United States v. O’Brien, the 
Court stated, “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined 
in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental 
interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental 
limitations on First Amendment freedom.”43 However, the 
government interest behind its regulation cannot be related to “the 
suppression of free expression.”44 The Court thus created a two-tier 
analysis where expressive conduct receives less stringent protection 
than pure speech.  
 
33. Joseph H. Hart, Free Speech on Private Property—When Fundamental 
Rights Collide, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1469, 1471 (1990) (“[I]n most cases the first 
amendment protects free speech against abridgement by the government but does 
not shield the exercise of speech on private property.”). 
34. EMERSON, supra note 27, at 295. 
35. Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163, 2209 (2018). 
36. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). 
37. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–411 (1974). 
38. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
39. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141–42 (1966). 
40. Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) 
41. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 406. 
42. See, e.g., Food Emps. v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313–14 
(1968); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983). 
43. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 




Even the most constitutionally protected protest—pure political 
speech in traditional fora like public streets and sidewalks—can be 
regulated by the government. Generally the government cannot base 
regulations on the content of protected speech, but it has wider 
discretion to regulate the time, place, and manner of such speech.45 
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed that, “even in a public forum 
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, 
place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions ‘are 
justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 
that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information.’”46 If the Court finds that 
government regulation is not content neutral, it will be subject to 
strict scrutiny,47 an exacting standard that regulation often fails.48  
Some scholars contend that viewpoint-based government 
restrictions are even more suspect than content-based 
discriminations, pointing to past court decisions.49 As scholar Joseph 
Blocher articulated, “[t]he prevention of viewpoint discrimination 
has long been considered the central concern of the First 
Amendment.”50 The prohibition on viewpoint discrimination is so 
strong that the Supreme Court has held that even speech normally 
unprotected by the First Amendment cannot be regulated differently 
based on the viewpoint it articulates.51 For example, fighting words 
are one of the few exceptions to the constitutional prohibition on 
content-based restrictions; the First Amendment does not protect 
them, and the government can restrict them.52 Nevertheless, even 
though the government could ban all fighting words, it cannot 
selectively ban “only those fighting words directed at Democrats.”53 
Such a move would be an impermissible restriction based on 
 
45. McCullen v. Coakley, 573 U.S. 464, 477 (2014). 
46. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).  
47. Goldberg, supra note 35, at 2184, 2208. 
48. Tamara R. Piety, The First Amendment and the Corporate Civil Rights 
Movement, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 1, 10 (2016). 
49. Goldberg, supra note 35, at 2208. 
50. Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 
52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 696 (2011). 
51. Id. at 703. 
52. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572–73 (1942). 
53. Blocher, supra note 50, at 703 (“Put simply: The government may not 





viewpoint. There is Supreme Court case law to suggest that “speech 
regulation may be held unconstitutional if viewpoint discrimination 
is so much as a part of the motivation for passing it.”54 Thus, even 
though the behavior targeted by the recent suite of bills and 
proposals—often the blocking of traffic—may not qualify as 
expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment,55 there may 
still be a case that the government regulation was the result of 
impermissible viewpoint-based discrimination, and the bills can be 
challenged on that ground.56 Some state governments have 
specifically articulated that their regulation was proposed in 
response to pipeline protesters,57 bolstering the argument for 
viewpoint-based discrimination. However, state governments can 
argue that their regulation or proposed regulation is merely a 
response to disorderly protests that undermine public order and 
safety rather than a targeting of specific viewpoints, making it more 
difficult to challenge regulation on those grounds.58  
A. The Right to Protest and Civil Disobedience 
Now that I have given a brief introduction to the basic principles 
and theory animating the constitutional right to protest and the case 
law defining the contours of that right, I will explore the relationship 
between civil disobedience and the right to protest. Many of the 
current legal tactics being used to restrict climate protesters are 
ostensibly targeted at conduct that falls under the umbrella of civil 
disobedience. Civil disobedience has many definitions, but there is a 
 
54. Id. at 703–04. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383-84 
(1992) (holding that even speech which falls outside the reach of the First 
Amendment, and therefore can be flatly prohibited, may not be treated differently 
on the basis of the viewpoint it expresses); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 
U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (“[R]egulation of communication may not be affected by 
sympathy or hostility for the point of view being expressed by the 
communicator.”). 
55. It is difficult to characterize obstruction of traffic as expressive conduct 
under the current Supreme Court jurisprudence. See, e.g., EMERSON, supra note 
27, at 293; Goldberg, supra note 35, at 2207–09. 
56. Goldberg, supra note 35, at 2208. 
57. See, e.g., Joe Wertz, Oklahoma Bill To Protect ‘Critical Infrastructure’ 








general consensus that “it entails a conscientious violation of the law 
as a protest over an unjust law or governmental policy and therefore, 
is morally justified.”59 Another scholar describes civil disobedience 
as “unlawful, public action, undertaken to protest a specific law or 
policy.”60 Under current jurisprudence, civil disobedience is largely 
categorized as unlawful conduct that does not receive First 
Amendment protection.61 However, as already described above, even 
laws targeting unprotected conduct or speech, like civil disobedience, 
can be held unconstitutional if the court finds they were motivated 
by viewpoint-discrimination. Some scholars argue that, given its 
profound social value, civil disobedience can and should receive some 
measure of First Amendment protection.62 I argue that harsh 
restrictions on civil disobedience chill constitutionally protected 
speech, undermine important democratic and First Amendment 
values, and fail to reflect the historical importance of civil 
disobedience in advancing positive change in the U.S. I argue further 
that this is especially true for those protesting in the face of the fossil 
fuel industry’s profound influence over public discourse around 
climate change. 
Scholars, UN officials, and civil rights organizations have 
warned that the recent spate of bills from across the U.S. that 
dramatically increase criminal and monetary penalties for protesters 
threatens to undermine lawful, constitutionally protected speech.63 
Although the bills, which are discussed in more detail in the next 
section, ostensibly target already unlawful behavior, such as 
trespassing or disorderly conduct, their draconian penalties— 
including a potential five-year jail sentence for anyone who 
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trespasses near a pipeline64—and broad language risk infringing on 
protected speech.  The International Center for Not-For-Profit Law 
warns that, “[g]iven the broad definition of critical infrastructure in 
many of the bills, peaceful protesters could potentially be prosecuted 
for felony trespass for simply accidentally protesting too close to a 
pipeline.”65 UN officials sounded a similar warning. They cited the 
example of a proposed bill from Colorado, arguing that the vague 
definition of “tampering” in the bill “could be interpreted very 
broadly, therefore encompassing a wide range of situations, such as 
a peaceful protest near the concerned area, which could be construed 
as going in and tampering with equipment. The bill could 
consequently deter protestors from assembling freely, especially in 
contexts of environmental protests.”66 
Scholars and civil rights groups also point to bill provisions 
protecting motorists from the negligent killing of protesters as clear 
attempts to chill protected speech.67 Such provisions “will not only 
deter protesters who are blocking traffic but may deter protesters 
who are standing in permissible locations.”68 As Thomas Emerson 
writes, protests can “involve large masses of people, hostile forces 
opposing each other face to face, [and] high emotions.”69 They are 
chaotic, messy, and can be frenzied; it is not always clear where the 
line between lawful protest ends and civil disobedience begins.  
When lawful protesters risk massive fines, criminal penalties, or a 
heightened fear of negligent driving, they may just stay home. As the 
American Civil Liberties Union warns, the bills that cause such an 
effect are unconstitutional.70 Moreover, those mentioned above are 
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not the only risks lawful protesters may face. As will be detailed in 
later sections, protestors may also face the prospect of being harassed 
and surveilled by private security forces, sometimes working in 
conjunction with state and federal authorities, who have often 
described protesters as extremists.71 They may also fear massive 
retaliatory lawsuits from corporate entities.72 It is critical to see the 
pattern of action directed at and felt by climate protesters to 
understand the full scope of the potential chilling of protected speech.   
There are reasons to question the imposition of draconian 
penalties for acts of civil disobedience beyond the chilling effect on 
constitutionally protected protest. Civil disobedience has a long 
history of positive social change in the U.S., and many scholars argue 
that it can advance important First Amendment and democratic 
values.73 Scholar Leslie Geilow Jacobs explains the critical difference 
between typical law breaking and civil disobedience: 
The usual lawbreaking is where one individual asserts his will 
against the will of the majority (embodied in the law) for selfish 
purposes, accompanied by an effort to avoid detection and 
punishment. The act is functional, rather than expressive, and the 
act evidences contempt for the democratic principle of majority rule. 
The civil disobedient also asserts his will against the will of the 
majority, but in a different way and for a different purpose. Civil 
disobedience is a public act. The purpose is to convey a political 
message from the minority to the majority. The civil disobedient’s 
willingness to accept the punishment demonstrates a respect for the 
general principle of the rule of law at the same time that the act 
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Geilow thus demonstrates how civil disobedience can retain social 
value while being unlawful. 
Indeed, scholars have long argued that civil disobedience plays 
a critical role in democratic societies and has had a key role in 
advancing U.S. political dialogue since before the American 
Revolution.75 Civil disobedience was a foundational tactic of the 
women’s suffrage movement, the civil rights movement, and various 
anti-war protests, among others.76	Matthew R. Hall describes civil 
disobedience as “a firebreak between legal protest and rebellion” 
allowing disaffected and disenfranchised voices to communicate 
their grievances without employing more extreme measures.77 
Others have echoed the idea that civil disobedience acts as an 
important safety valve for the disaffected.78 Thomas Emerson 
argued that one of the four key principles animating freedom of 
speech theory and doctrine was maintaining a balance between 
stability and change in a democratic society.79  
Scholars also point to the unique ability of civil disobedience to 
lift up marginalized voices, ensuring the robust marketplace of ideas 
so central to First Amendment jurisprudence.80 As Lawrence R. 
Velvel explains,  
our modern-communications media are the key to whether or not the 
marketplace of ideas can function effectively . . . . When citizens lack 
access to these media, often because of the lack of the astronomical 
financial resources necessary or because of a lack of high political 
position, they have little opportunity to contribute effectively to the 
process by which public opinion is formed.81 
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Yet, media covers peaceful protest, making it one of the most 
effective ways for voices usually locked out of traditional mass media 
to be heard.82 James Pope raises a parallel point, arguing that civil 
disobedience and a range of other nonviolent, popular, extra-
institutional tactics are uniquely able to challenge the corruption 
and power imbalance of interest group bargaining.83 As Pope 
explains, interest group bargaining creates a distortion in the 
political marketplace, where “interest groups active on an issue 
represent substantially less than the entire population, [and] they 
can agree on a solution that will benefit themselves by transferring 
wealth from underrepresented constituencies.”84 Corporations are 
often the beneficiaries of such interest group bargaining.85 By more 
forcefully disrupting the status quo, civil disobedience has the 
potential to coerce an audience to pay attention and to “divert . . .  
politicians and administrators from the cozy routine of interest group 
bargaining.”86 Thus, civil disobedience can advance key democratic 
and First Amendment values even if it is unlawful.  
Of course, some scholars have argued that seeing civil 
disobedience as a vehicle to advance democratic and First 
Amendment values is an overly idealistic view of civil disobedience. 
The state has a critical interest in protecting the rule of law, a 
foundational presumption of which is “that the proper form of protest 
against particular government actions is through lawful speech and 
action designed to change it.”87 In a functioning democracy, civil 
disobedience can be seen as undermining democratically created 
laws and policies.88 Steven Schlesinger argues that civil disobedience 
would be utterly destructive to democratic institutions if everyone 
disobeyed the laws they disagreed with, with little consequence.89 He 
also points to theoretical examples of civil disobedience that would 
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undermine justice rather advance it.90 Yet, many scholars who 
believe that civil disobedience advances important democratic and 
First Amendment values also acknowledge that breaking the law can 
undermine democratic systems and, thus, argue that “civil 
disobedients” can and should face legal consequences for their 
actions.91  
Leslie Geilow Jacobs threads the gap between the democratic 
values advanced by civil disobedience and those undermined by such 
action by focusing on the type and amount of penalties individuals 
who engage in civil disobedience should face. She argues that the 
social value of the law-breaking act of the civil disobedience must be 
considered when deciding on a punishment.92 Even given the state’s 
interest in maintaining the rule of law, the new bills targeting civil 
disobedience are disproportionately punitive. As discussed below, 
Louisiana’s new law bumped potential punishment for civil 
disobedience near a pipeline from misdemeanor trespass to felony 
charges carrying a potential five-year prison term and up to $1000 
in fines.93 The Trump administration proposed amending pipeline 
safety standards to include language threatening twenty-year prison 
terms for civil disobedience near pipelines.94 In temporarily 
enjoining South Dakota’s new provisions aimed at climate protesters 
who engage in or “support” civil disobedience, the district court 
warned that such provisions could have imposed immense damages 
on Dr. Martin Luther King and his fellow civil rights leaders.95 
Climate civil disobedience can advance important values; although 
the state has an interest in ensuring respect for the rule of law, the 
disproportionately harsh penalties detailed above go far and above 
that interest and are detrimental to democracy. 
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The fossil fuel industry has played an important role in pushing 
governments to make climate civil disobedience exponentially more 
risky, even though its efforts at undermining public participation in 
the climate debate have been a key driver behind such disobedience. 
The fossil fuel industry has leveraged interest group bargaining and 
financial resources to exert a profoundly outsized influence on the 
political marketplace and the marketplace of ideas in the U.S. The 
fossil fuel industry and its allies have spent massive amounts of 
money sowing misinformation around climate change science for 
decades.96 This manufactured uncertainty campaign not only 
distorts the marketplace of ideas by giving powerful interests 
disproportionate influence, but it also fundamentally undermines 
the marketplace by keeping key facts from the public. As emphasized 
in a previous article:  
This is the landscape climate protesters face—decades of deliberate 
strategies to confuse the public and influence government decision 
makers, hundreds of millions of dollars in corporate funding to delay 
or prevent government action on climate change, crackdowns on 
peaceful protest, and scientific research saying the world is on the 
brink of disaster. It is not hard to see how such climate protesters 
would feel like their options for effectively challenging [the fossil fuel 
industry and its allies’] framing of climate change and spurring 
public and government interest have been dramatically narrowed.97  
At the very moment when civil disobedience seems like it could 
uniquely challenge the political status quo and urgently advance 
marginalized voices in a moment of impending climate crisis, the 
penalties for climate civil disobedience are being ratcheted up to 
draconian levels. Such penalties are bad for democracy. 
III. TACTICS TO RESTRICT AND TARGET CLIMATE 
PROTEST 
A. Critical Infrastructure Bills 
As mentioned above, there has been a recent wave of bills, both 
proposed and enacted, restricting protest more broadly, and climate 
protest more specifically, in the U.S.  The International Center for 
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Not-For-Profit Law (ICNL) is tracking both trends in its U.S. Protest 
Law Tracker, which “tracks legal initiatives since November 2016 
that restrict the right to peaceful assembly.”98 The ICNL “works in 
more than 100 countries to strengthen civil society, foster freedom of 
association and assembly, and promote public participation in the 
political sphere.”99 As of January 2021, federal and state 
governments have considered 146 bills “that restrict the right to 
peaceful assembly,” and 25 of such bills had been enacted.100 The 
ICNL is also tracking what they and others call “critical 
infrastructure bills,”101 which “are used to target demonstrations 
against oil and gas pipelines across the country.”102 I will also use 
the term critical infrastructure bills to describe such legislative 
provisions in this article. These bills have been enacted in nine states 
but there are a spate of other proposals pending or defeated at the 
federal and state level,103 and a legal adviser for the ICNL believes 
the trend will continue.104 The fossil fuel industry can be connected 
to many of the bills, even deeply connected to some, either through 
its support in drafting specific state bills, in drafting model bills 
being used at the state and federal level, or in advocating and 
testifying for bills’ passage.105 Scholars and journalists have pointed 
to the movement against DAPL as a key impetus for the recent wave 
of legislative restrictions on climate protesters, although there were 
some initial attempts before the DAPL protest.106 I will briefly 
 
98. U.S. Protest Law Tracker Methodology and Key Terms, supra note 16. 
99. Former Schell Fellow Nick Robinson Directs Program on U.S. Civil 
Freedoms, YALE L. SCH. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://law.yale.edu/yls-
today/news/former-schell-fellow-nick-robinson-directs-program-us-civil-freedoms 
[https://perma.cc/4UTS-J799]. 
100. See U.S. Protest Law Tracker, supra note 12. 
101. U.S. Current Trend: Environmental Nonprofits Facing Lawfare Tactics, 




103. See U.S. Protest Law Tracker, supra note 12. 
104. Susie Cagle, ‘Protesters as Terrorists’: Growing Number of States Turn 
Anti-pipeline Activism into a Crime, THE GUARDIAN (July 8, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2019/jul/08/wave-of-new-laws-aim-
to-stifle-anti-pipeline-protests-activists-say [https://perma.cc/7D6C-FEUF]. 
105. See infra notes 121, 130 (Kaufman), 169, 179, 189, 194 and 
accompanying text. 
106. Connor Gibson, Oklahoma – Oil & Gas “Critical Infrastructure” Anti-





describe the anti-DAPL movement below and how it spurred the 
legislative restrictions. I will also provide a high-level description of 
the bills themselves, highlighting the similarities across legislation. 
Then I will draw out the fossil fuel industry’s connections to various 
bills, demonstrating the substantial role the fossil fuel industry has 
played in the government move to restrict climate protesters. 
1. The Dakota Access Pipeline and its Resistance 
Movement 
In 2014, Energy Transfer Partners began applying for the 
construction of a crude oil pipeline from the Bakken oil fields in 
North Dakota to southern Illinois.107 The route of the pipeline passes 
within a half mile of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe’s reservation, on 
territory the Tribe considers treaty land.108 In a legal complaint filed 
against the federal government, the Standing Rock Sioux argued 
that DAPL “threatens the Tribe’s environmental and economic well-
being, and would damage and destroy sites of great historic, 
religious, and cultural significance to the Tribe . . . .  [DAPL] also 
crosses waters of utmost cultural, spiritual, ecological, and economic 
significance to the Tribe and its members.”109 Resistance to the 
pipeline grew as it received all of the requisite approvals from state 
and federal entities.110 On April 1, 2016, 200 Native Americans rode 
on horseback to protest the pipeline’s route through the sacred, 
ancestral lands of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe.111 The riders, 
Lakota, Nakota, and Dakota peoples, established a small campsite 
where the Missouri and Cannonball rivers meet, called the Sacred 
Stone Camp, and announced their intention to oppose DAPL and 
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protect the water.112 As the year progressed and a flood of supporters 
arrived, more camps were established.113  
As hundreds of camp residents readied for an indefinite stay, 
and Energy Transfer broke ground on the pipeline without waiting 
for the final resolution of legal challenges by the Standing Rock 
Sioux, conflict between water protectors, government law 
enforcement, and private security forces escalated.114 In fall 2016, 
DAPL security guards attacked water protectors with dogs and 
pepper spray.115 Energy Transfer Partners hired TigerSwan, a 
paramilitary organization, to oversee its security response to the 
anti-DAPL movement.116 As will be described in later sections, 
TigerSwan proceeded to surveil and harass water protectors, whom 
it viewed as akin to jihadists. Militarized local police confronted 
water protectors with sound cannons, fired rubber bullets and water 
cannons at them in sub-freezing temperatures, and arrested 
hundreds of them in a manner that drew international 
condemnation and allegations of unlawful detainment.117 Although 
the outgoing Obama administration denied a final permit for the 
pipeline in late October 2016, the Trump administration reversed 
course and granted the pipeline the go-ahead in early January 
2017.118 
2. State Critical Infrastructure Bills 
In early 2017, Oklahoma began the legislative process to pass 
some of the first in a wave of critical infrastructure bills restricting 
climate protesters.119 The state ultimately passed two bills, House 
Bill 1123 and House Bill 2128, that dramatically raised penalties for 
those protesting critical infrastructure in the state.120 UN officials 
 
112. Oil and Water, THE INTERCEPT, https://theintercept.com/series/oil-and-
water/timeline/ [https://perma.cc/9UXS-Y4WV]. 
113.	 Ruddock, supra note 15, at 672; Cheree Franco, The Final, Messy, 
Defiant Days of the Standing Rock Camps, VICE (Feb. 21, 2017), 
https://www.vice.com/en_ca/article/gvmypx/the-final-messy-defiant-days-of-the-
standing-rock-camps [https://perma.cc/3ZFJ-U9QS]. 
114.	Ruddock, supra note 15, at 672. 
115. Oil and Water, supra note 112. 
116. Id. 
117. Ruddock, supra note 15, at 672–73. 
118. Id. at 673.  
119. Id. at 674; Letter from the Special Rapporteurs, supra note 13, at 8. 




warned that House Bill 1123 was reportedly introduced in response 
to the anti-DAPL movement.121 The principal author of House Bill 
1123, State Representative Scott Briggs, pointed at disruptive 
protests in advocating for the bill’s passage, saying: “Across the 
country, we’ve seen time and time again these protests that have 
turned violent, these protests that have disrupted the infrastructure 
in those other states.”122 House Bill 1123 changes the law so that 
protesters risk a ten-year-prison term or $100,000 fine if they 
“willfully damage, destroy, vandalize, deface or tamper with 
equipment in a critical infrastructure facility.”123  
Further, House Bill 2128 holds those who trespass, or 
potentially even those merely arrested for trespass, liable for 
damages incurred during the trespass.124 Additionally, the law 
states that any person or group  “that compensates, provides 
consideration to or remunerates a person for trespassing” may be 
held vicariously liable for damages incurred during the trespass.125 
Scholars and practitioners argue that such collective liability 
provisions deter constitutional advocacy by non-profits and other 
civil society groups and movements.126 Oklahoma’s two critical 
infrastructure bills were introduced in early 2017 and signed into 
law in May 2017.127 A spate of similar bills in other states 
followed.128  
a. ALEC’s Model Critical Infrastructure Bill 
One of the next critical milestones in the growing wave of anti-
protest legislation was the creation of a model critical infrastructure 
bill by the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in 
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January 2018.129 ALEC, a membership organization funded largely 
by corporations, supports corporate entities and state lawmakers in 
working together to create template legislation that can be proposed 
in state legislatures across the U.S.130 As stated on its website, ALEC 
drew from Oklahoma’s 2017 bills to create its own model critical 
infrastructure bill, which it called the Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Act.131 The model legislation: 
[C]odifies criminal penalties for a person convicted of willfully 
trespassing or entering property containing a critical infrastructure 
facility without permission by the owner of the property, and holds a 
person liable for any damages to personal or real property while 
trespassing. The Act also prescribes criminal penalties for 
organizations conspiring with persons who willfully trespass and/or 
damage critical infrastructure sites, and holds conspiring 
organizations responsible for any damages to personal or real 
property while trespassing.132 
The model legislation echoes the same troubling collective 
liability provision enshrined in the Oklahoma legislation. Below, I 
will describe why such provisions raise constitutional red flags. Less 
than a week after the creation of the ALEC model legislation, 
legislators in Ohio and Iowa proposed similar critical infrastructure 
bills.133 By January 2020, eleven states had passed critical 
infrastructure bills and a myriad of others had pending or defeated 
bills;134 many of the bills resemble ALEC’s model bill.135 Below I will 
highlight some of the key similarities between the bills to underscore 
that they do indeed represent a legislative trend. 
b. Similarities Between State Bills  
There are discernable patterns between who has proposed 
critical infrastructure bills, when they are most likely to succeed, and 
what content they contain. Most, but not all, of the bills have been 
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proposed and championed by conservative lawmakers.136 They tend 
to find the most receptive audience in states where oil and gas 
companies wield political influence or where climate protests have 
been especially robust.137 While the bills’ exact provisions may vary, 
they have many similarities in their content. One thing civil rights 
organizations have noted is that the bills target behavior that is 
usually already punishable under the law.138 Indeed, when 
Minnesota Governor Mark Dayton vetoed a critical infrastructure 
bill proposed in the state, he underscored this point, writing, 
“Minnesota’s laws already address criminal activity and liability. 
[Those] statutes are clear; this proposed law is not.”139 
The ICNL identified four other key patterns in the content of 
critical infrastructure bills. The first is that the bills create extremely 
broad legal definitions of “critical infrastructure,” expanding beyond 
critical infrastructure with obvious, discrete boundaries like power 
plants and dams to infrastructure that is ubiquitous and has far less 
obvious boundaries, like oil and gas pipelines, and even telephone 
poles.140 Louisiana’s new definition of critical infrastructure, which, 
as of August 2018, included the state’s 125,000-mile network of 
pipelines, shows the potential consequences for climate protesters of 
such broad legislative definitions.141 The majority of Louisiana’s 
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pipelines are not clearly marked and the Center for Constitutional 
Rights argues that landowners, pedestrians, and commercial 
boaters, among others, “now cannot be sure of where they can 
lawfully remain present.”142 In expanding critical infrastructure 
definitions to include more ubiquitous infrastructure that was not 
treated as critical infrastructure in the past, legislators have made it 
difficult for the public to know when they are violating the law. 
The second discernible pattern is the codification of a new 
offense—felony trespass on critical infrastructure sites, often paired 
with the potential for long jail terms.143 Again, Louisiana provides a 
helpful example of how such legislative changes can impact climate 
protesters. Before the 2018 law took effect, protesters or those 
participating in civil disobedience near pipelines risked being 
charged with misdemeanor trespass.144 After, such protester now 
faces felony charges carrying the potential of a five-year prison term 
and up to $1,000 in fines.145 Commentators fear that these 
provisions could put peaceful protesters at risk of felony prosecution 
“for simply accidentally protesting too close to a pipeline.”146 
Indeed, the Center for Constitutional Rights has challenged 
Louisiana’s amended Critical Infrastructure law, Louisiana Revised 
Statute § 14:61, on behalf of pipeline protesters, landowners, 
community leaders, environmental justice organizations, and a 
journalist.147 The plaintiffs allege the statute is unconstitutional 
because it is vague and overbroad, it targets protected speech and 
conduct, and it was motivated by viewpoint-discrimination.148 Three 
of the plaintiffs, Anne White Hat, Ramon Mejía, and Karen Savage—
a journalist—were arrested and charged under Louisiana’s amended 
statute and are facing a potential sentence of five years in prison as 
well as substantial fines.149 The plaintiffs’ complaint quotes from the 
arrest warrants for the plaintiffs, highlighting that plaintiffs were 
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confused about where they could and could not legally be. The 
complaint summarizes the arrest affidavit for Anne White Hat in the 
following way: 
[White Hat] was “on the pipeline right of way” with approximately 
30-35 other protesters. For the second charge under La. R.S. 14:61, 
the affidavit states that White Hat “started to walk back up the 
incline,” which according to the affidavit was in the right of way, but 
then noted that she moved off the incline along with others after 
discussion with officers.150  
Obviously, the complaint is an advocacy document, intended to 
show plaintiffs’ actions in the best light, but it does give a sense of 
how the amended Critical Infrastructure law might be used to levy 
draconian penalties on protesters, even protesters claiming they 
were not trying to engage in unlawful behavior. It also shows how 
broad definitions of critical infrastructure paired with heavy felony 
penalties might have a serious chilling effect on climate protester 
activism. Indeed, the plaintiff environmental justice organizations 
argued that Louisiana’s amendments were undermining their lawful 
political speech, advocacy, and protest.151 
The third key pattern discernable in the proliferation of critical 
infrastructure bills is the creation of “new felony crimes of impeding 
the construction or operation of critical infrastructure.”152 Again, 
commentators warn that such provisions put peaceful, lawful 
protesters at risk of felony charges if their “protest merely 
inconveniences the movement of construction equipment or 
personnel.”153  
Finally, there is a pattern of new collective liability provisions in 
the bills which “can create liability for other protesters or 
organizations that are found to have been ‘conspirators’ or to have 
encouraged or advised a protester’s unlawful activity, such as 
trespass.”154 The ICNL has pointed out all of the ways that these 
collective liability provisions can encroach on or discourage 
constitutionally protected protest. One problem is that the provisions 
are framed in terms of conspiracy, which only requires that 
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conspirators take steps towards an unlawful act rather than 
committing an unlawful act.155 Thus, if groups or individuals merely 
take steps towards planning an act of civil disobedience, or even 
chant encouragement for those committing civil disobedience, they 
could in theory be charged with conspiracy.156 It may sound unlikely, 
but conspiracy charges have recently been used in exactly that way 
against protesters in the U.S.157 In addition to making it easier to 
prosecute protesters and organizations, framing these collective 
liability provisions in terms of conspiracy also gives law enforcement 
broader latitude to surveil and arrest protesters.158 As the ICNL 
explains: 
A warrant for law enforcement to engage in surveillance may be 
given on “probable cause”, which is defined as a “fair probability” 
that evidence of a crime will be found. It is generally easier for law 
enforcement to show that there is a “fair probability” that they will 
find evidence of a conspiracy than other crimes, because a conspiracy 
does not require an individual to have engaged in any unlawful 
activity.159 
Difficulty in controlling what will happen at a protest makes 
matters even more complicated for organizations or movements that 
support protests and protestors. Groups that only support lawful, 
constitutional protests cannot be sure that someone at the protest 
will not engage in civil disobedience, and the threat of facing 
vicarious liability for others’ civil disobedience may hinder them from 
supporting lawful speech and assembly.160    
South Dakota’s 2019 Riot Boosting Act is a prime example of 
how these collective liability provisions might infringe on 
constitutionally protected speech.161 The Act, which South Dakota 
Governor Kristi Noem stated herself when it was proposed, was 
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created to “help ensure the Keystone XL pipeline and other future 
pipeline projects are built in a safe and efficient manner.”162 The Act 
created a “fund and legal remedies to pursue out-of-state money 
funding the riots aiming to shut down the pipeline build.”163 It also 
created a new legal term, “riot-boosting,” stating that a person is 
liable for any damages incurred from “riot-boosting,” even if that 
person does not participate in a riot, but “directs, advises, 
encourages, or solicits other persons participating in the riot to acts 
of force or violence.”164 
The ACLU immediately challenged the Act, as well as two felony 
riot statutes, arguing that they were unconstitutional.165 The 
District Court recognized the potential for the Act’s riot-boosting 
definition to capture a significant portion of constitutionally 
protected speech, writing: 
Sending a supporting email or a letter to the editor in support of a 
protest is encouraging. Giving a cup of coffee or thumbs up or $10 to 
protesters is encouraging. . . . Asking someone to protest is soliciting. 
. . . Suggesting that the protest sign be bigger is advising. The 
possible violations of those felony or damage creating statutes 
against advising, encouraging or soliciting goes on and on. 
Encouragement, advice, or solicitation for the protest on social media 
would be a fertile ground for damages or charges or both. And each 
of these examples involve protected speech or expressive activity.166 
The Court pointed to civil rights era cases defining the robust 
right to protest, underscoring that “mere advocacy, even if 
distasteful, is protected speech as distinguished from incitement to 
immediate lawless action” and found that the statute 
unconstitutionally infringed on protected speech.167 This is a clear 
example of how a law ostensibly targeted at unlawful behavior or 
civil disobedience can actually threaten lawful protest. After the 
Court temporarily enjoined the portions of the statutes it found to 
violate First Amendment protections, South Dakota reached a 
settlement agreement saying it would never enforce the parts of the 
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statute the Court had found to be unconstitutional.168 However, just 
two months later, in December 2019, Governor Noem wrote to the 
South Dakota legislature, stating that “‘riot boosting is still in effect 
and enforceable’” and proposing new changes to the laws to avoid 
judicial censure.169 The ACLU responded to Governor Noem’s memo, 
warning of serious constitutional shortcomings in the laws and 
arguing that Governor Noem had misrepresented the extent of the 
state’s ability to enforce such laws after the settlement agreement.170 
3. The Federal Government’s Critical Infrastructure 
Proposals 
Similarly to state governments, the federal government has 
advanced its own proposals around critical infrastructure, with 
provisions echoing the ALEC model bill.171 Under the Trump 
administration, the Department of Transportation’s Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration asked Congress to 
amend pipeline safety standards to include language threatening 
twenty-year prison terms and fines for “damaging or destroying” 
existing pipelines and those under construction.172 An attorney for 
the ICNL said the Trump administration’s “proposed penalty is far 
and away more extreme than what we’ve seen at the state level.”173 
Key Democratic lawmakers were dismissive of the proposed 
criminalization provisions; a spokesperson for Energy and 
Commerce Chairman Frank Pallone said he would not “allow[] a 
pipeline safety bill to be used as a vehicle for stifling legitimate 
dissent and protest.”174 Fossil fuel industry lobbyists have pushed 
for other versions of pipeline safety bills moving through Congress to 
 
168. Eidelman, supra note 20. 
169. Stephen Groves, South Dakota Governor Plans Revision of Riot-boosting 




171. See Lefebvre & Adragna, supra note 15.  
172. Id. (calling for Congress to “expand a law that threatens fines and up to 
20 years' prison time for ‘damaging or destroying’ pipelines currently in 
operation,” with the expanded version adding "vandalism, tampering with, or 
impeding, disrupting or inhibiting the operation of" either existing pipelines or 
those "under construction"). 
173. Id. (combining provisions that vague to penalties that extreme creates 
uncertainty about what is and is not legal).  




have criminalization provisions, but such provisions are also facing 
opposition from key Democratic lawmakers.175 As of February 2020 
the legislation was still pending, but it is clear that the trend of 
restricting climate protesters has been embraced by some actors and 
legislators in the federal government.  
4. Industry Connection to Critical Infrastructure 
Legislation 
Although the move to stifle climate protesters is often framed as 
a government effort, it is critical to draw out the role of industry in 
creating, championing, and advancing the legislative trend. The 
fossil fuel industry’s influence has been immense, and it has also 
been leveraged through diverse avenues, making it impossible to 
cover every instance of influence here. I will focus on how the fossil 
fuel industry was involved from the early stages of the legislative 
push, drawing out the industry influence behind the ALEC model 
bill. I will also highlight several examples of particularly heavy 
industry influence on specific state and federal proposals. Finally, I 
will underscore the key role of industry trade and lobbying groups 
like the American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers and the 
American Petroleum Institute (API), in championing the 
government restrictions.  
a. The Industry Influence Behind the ALEC 
Model Bill 
As discussed above, many of the state and federal proposals to 
restrict climate protesters echo provisions in the ALEC model critical 
infrastructure bill, which was officially approved by ALEC’s board in 
January 2018.176 ALEC itself has proven to be a center for fossil fuel 
industry influence. In a 2011 report, the Center for Media and 
Democracy found that nearly 98% of ALEC’s funding came from 
sources other than legislative dues, including corporations, corporate 
 
175. Lee Fang & Nick Surgey, Oil Lobbyists Attempt to Influence Pipeline 
Safety Legislation to Further Criminalize Pipeline Protests, THE INTERCEPT (Sept. 
27, 2019), https://theintercept.com/2019/09/27/pipeline-safety-legislation/ 
[https://perma.cc/N35Z-YTDM]. 




foundations, and trade associations.177 Corporations can pay up to 
$25,000 a year or more for membership.178 The American Petroleum 
Institute (API) has funded ALEC, while ExxonMobil and its 
foundation gave more than $1.4 million to the organization over a 
decade.179  
As ALEC publicly stated, it drew from Oklahoma’s two critical 
infrastructure bills enacted in 2017 to create its own model bill.180 In 
fact, one of those bills, House Bill 2128, was originally authored by a 
confirmed ALEC legislative member, Charles McCall.181 Greenpeace 
reports that Charles McCall has taken more than $48,000 in 
donations from the oil and gas industry and its employees.182 Thus 
an ALEC legislative member with deep ties to the fossil fuel industry 
proposed one of the two bills ultimately used by ALEC to create its 
own model bill. However, those are not the only avenues of fossil fuel 
industry influence behind the creation of the ALEC model bill. In 
December 2017, fossil fuel trade groups, a think tank, and one 
individual corporation wrote a letter addressed to state lawmakers, 
asking for their support in getting ALEC to officially adopt the 
Critical Infrastructure Protection Act as one of its model bills.183 In 
the letter, these industry stakeholders warned that “[e]nergy 
infrastructure is often targeted by environmental activists to raise 
awareness of climate change,” and those actions can “cause millions 
of dollars in damage.”184 The letter provides clear evidence that 
members of the fossil fuel industry saw the ALEC model bill, and 
consequently the state proposals drawing from the bill, as a way to 
target what they considered disruptive and risky climate protests. 
Having highlighted evidence of industry influence on the ALEC 
 
177. Lisa Graves, A CMD Special Report on ALEC's Funding and Spending, 
CTR. FOR MEDIA & DEMOCRACY’S PRWATCH (July 13, 2011), 
https://www.prwatch.org/news/2011/07/10887/cmd-special-report-alecs-funding-
and-spending [https://perma.cc/AZH7-J2CF].  
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
180. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
181. H.B. 2128, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2017); Oklahoma ALEC 
Politicians, SOURCEWATCH, (Aug. 11, 2020), 
https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Oklahoma_ALEC_Politicians 
[https://perma.cc/A7Y9-MCNN]. 
182. Gibson, supra note 106. 
183. Kaufman, supra note 136.   
184. Id. Letter from American Legislative Executive Council to State 





model bill, I will now provide several more examples of how state 
critical infrastructure bills were heavily influenced by the fossil fuel 
industry.  
b. Louisiana 
One of the most explicit examples of industry influence comes 
from Louisiana. In 2018, the President and General Counsel of 
Louisiana Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, a trade 
association representing oil and gas industry sectors in Louisiana, 
drafted the updates that the state legislature made to Louisiana’s 
Critical Infrastructure law, as discussed above.185 These updates 
imposed drastically heavier criminal and financial penalties on 
trespassers, while simultaneously making it much less clear to 
potential protesters when they were trespassing by creating an 
immensely broad definition of critical infrastructure. According to 
the complaint filed by the Center for Constitutional Rights 
challenging the law, the President and General Counsel of the trade 
association stated publicly at Tulane Law School that he had 
followed in the footsteps of Oklahoma, working with the Oklahoma 
Oil and Gas Association, to draft the amendments to Louisiana’s 
Critical Infrastructure law.186 
c. South Dakota 
There is also evidence of deep industry collaboration and 
influence on South Dakota’s critical infrastructure bill, which 
pioneered the legal term “riot-boosting” in an attempt to broadly 
define and punish collective liability for protesters and organizations 
supporting protests.187 As reported by various news outlets, 
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TransCanada, the parent company of the Keystone XL tar sands 
pipeline, which expected massive protests against the pipeline, 
worked with South Dakota’s government to shape the critical 
infrastructure bill.188 South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem publicly 
recognized the collaboration with TransCanada on the critical 
infrastructure bill in anticipation of Keystone XL protests. She said 
the legislation would “help ensure the Keystone XL pipeline and 
other future pipeline projects are built in a safe and efficient 
manner.”189 The Governor and her team had met with TransCanada 
and others “to discuss the Keystone XL pipeline project and to listen 
and develop legislative solutions that allow for an orderly 
construction process for this pipeline.”190  
South Dakota and Louisiana are particularly obvious examples 
of industry influence, but they are just the tip of the iceberg. A Texas 
newspaper reported that the authors of the state’s critical 
infrastructure bill had attended ALEC conferences in recent years 
and that one had received substantial campaign contributions from 
energy companies in 2018, while many fossil fuel industry 
corporations and associations had officially registered support of the 
bill with the legislature.191 Iowa’s lobbying disclosure records show 
that a myriad of fossil fuel corporations and trade groups lobbied for 
the passage of a similar critical infrastructure bill within the 
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state.192 Although I cannot highlight the industry influence on every 
state bill here, examples of such influence abound. Greenpeace’s 
project PolluterWatch is tracking the industry influence behind each 
critical infrastructure bill.193 
d. The Influence of Fossil Fuel Trade and 
Lobbying Organizations 
Finally, I will highlight the influence of fossil fuel industry trade 
and lobbying organizations on the wave of critical infrastructure 
bills. It is important to highlight the role of trade and lobbying 
organizations because they demonstrate the breadth of fossil fuel 
industry support for the legislative restrictions of climate protesters. 
Some of them also serve as a key link between the fossil fuel 
industry’s push to undermine climate science for decades and its 
more recent push to stifle climate protesters.  
As described above, trade and lobbying groups pushed for ALEC 
to adopt its critical infrastructure model bill.194 One of those groups 
was American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM), an 
energy trade association with more than 450 corporate members,195 
a Board of Directors that has included ExxonMobil, Chevron, and 
BP,196 and a history of working to defeat government climate 
action.197 A 2019 Bloomberg News report found that “[t]he AFPM, 
and one of its top members, Marathon Petroleum Corp., spearheaded 
efforts to get ALEC to support the model legislation in 2017, 
according to two people familiar with the matter who asked not to be 
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named discussing internal strategy.”198 The Intercept obtained an 
audio recording featuring Derrick Morgan, a senior vice president for 
federal and regulatory affairs at AFPM, speaking about the group’s 
involvement in the wave of critical infrastructure bills at the Energy 
& Mineral Law Foundation conference.199 In the recording, Morgan 
says that AFPM has had “a lot of success at the state level,” adding 
that “we’re up to nine states that have passed laws that are 
substantially close to the [ALEC] model policy.”200 Morgan’s remarks 
underscore two things. The first is that, as many commentators have 
assumed, legislators are drawing inspiration from ALEC’s model bill 
to propose their own critical infrastructure bills. Second, the remarks 
also underscore that AFPM thinks of the model bill as its own project 
and is closely monitoring its success at the state level. There is more 
evidence to show that AFPM is advocating for, and even drafting, 
critical infrastructure bills in different states.201 
The American Petroleum Institute (API), the largest oil and gas 
trade association in the U.S., has also influenced the wave of critical 
infrastructure bills restricting climate protesters.202 The Center for 
Media and Democracy reports that API seems to be the driving force 
behind the critical infrastructure bill proposed in Wisconsin.203 
Iowa’s lobbying disclosure records also show that API advocated for 
the state’s critical infrastructure bill.204 Other fossil fuel industry 
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trade groups have aggressively pushed for federal legislation 
mirroring the recent spate of state critical infrastructure bills.205  
B. Use of Violence and Surveillance Against Protesters, 
and the Push to Label Them as Terrorists and 
Extremists 
In addition to the wave of industry-backed critical infrastructure 
bills, climate protesters also face the threat of surveillance and 
violence from industry, paramilitary, and government stakeholders. 
This threat against lawful protest is most greatly felt where those 
who disagree with climate protesters have led a rhetorical push to 
label such protesters as terrorists and extremists. As with the 
legislative restrictions on climate protesters, there is clear fossil fuel 
industry influence behind the threatening tactics of surveillance and 
violence. Unlike the first and third categories of tactics targeting 
climate protesters discussed in this article—critical infrastructure 
legislation and retaliatory litigation—this section’s legal tactics are 
not as uniform. Nevertheless, government and industry stakeholders 
are relying on various legal tactics to surveil protesters and to label 
them extremists, and it is important to draw out the various ways in 
which law is facilitating these actions. These tactics include federal 
lawmakers asking the Justice Department whether critical 
infrastructure protesters can be targeted under the Patriot Act, 
paramilitary security forces planning to pressure law enforcement to 
prosecute protesters more harshly, and prosecutors issuing broad 
warrants for social media activity connected to climate protests. In 
this section, I will explore how the fossil fuel industry has used 
private security forces to respond to protesters, as well as how 
government stakeholders are cooperating with industry and private 
security forces to coordinate their responses to protesters. I will also 
explore the push by private security, industry, and government 
stakeholders to label broad swathes of protesters as terrorists and 
extremists, as well as how social media is being used to surveil and 
potentially punish climate protesters. 
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1. Paramilitary and Private Security Forces Being 
Used Against Climate Protesters 
One of the most troubling examples of private security forces 
being used against climate protesters and water protectors comes 
from the resistance against DAPL.  As discussed above, Energy 
Transfer Partners, the company behind DAPL, hired TigerSwan to 
coordinate its response to the Indigenous-led movement against the 
pipeline.206 TigerSwan is a private security firm created by retired 
military officers in 2007.207 The company publicly touts its years of 
“global combat leadership” as well as its ability to “monitor, protect, 
and secure your assets with mobile and fixed-site security and rapid 
response and deployment.”208 When Energy Transfer Partners hired 
TigerSwan to monitor its response to the anti-DAPL movement, the 
firm leveraged its “global combat leadership” against Indigenous 
water protectors and their allies, largely U.S. citizens. Internal 
documents leaked to The Intercept by a TigerSwan contractor show 
a troubling picture of how the company monitored protesters.209 
After reviewing those records, as well as more than a thousand 
others obtained through public record requests, The Intercept found 
that “TigerSwan spearheaded a multifaceted private security 
operation characterized by sweeping and invasive surveillance of 
protesters.”210 
The TigerSwan documents made public by The Intercept provide 
clear evidence of the company monitoring water protectors, 
collaborating with lawmakers from across states, attempting to sow 
discord between water protectors and their allies along racial lines, 
and viewing water protectors and protesters as being akin to 
“jihadists.”211 In a TigerSwan situation report from October 3, 2016, 
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company employees wrote that they “met with campus police from 
University of Illinois and Lincoln Land College in Springfield, IL. 
Both agencies reported nothing seen or heard of public postings 
about developing protest support among the students against DAPL 
project.”212 This internal report reveals a disturbing state of affairs—
that a private security firm hired by a fossil fuel company was 
monitoring university students hundreds of miles away from a 
pipeline construction site to determine if they were engaging in 
constitutionally protected political speech. 
The private security force was not only monitoring and 
surveilling those opposed to (or even potentially opposed to) the 
DAPL, but it was actively trying to turn them against each other. 
The company wrote that “[e]xploitation of ongoing native versus non-
native rifts . . . is critical in our efforts to delegitimize the anti-DAPL 
movement.”213 The company clearly viewed water protectors as 
extremists and treated them accordingly. In a situation report from 
February 27, 2017, TigerSwan employees wrote that the anti-DAPL 
movement “generally followed the jihadist insurgency model”214 and 
that “aggressive intelligence preparation of the battlefield and active 
coordination between intelligence and security elements are now a 
proven method of defeating pipeline insurgencies.”215 TigerSwan 
expanded its target far beyond potential perpetrators of civil 
disobedience at the pipeline construction site, going so far as to speak 
to campus security in a different state about what would have been 
completely lawful and highly protected political speech in its attempt 
to “defeat pipeline insurgencies.”216 Since the First Amendment only 
protects against government action infringing on protected speech, 
private companies have wider leeway to scrutinize and monitor 
political speech. However, civil rights attorneys have pointed out the 
danger in allowing private security firms to monitor, surveil, and 
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undermine speech that would be protected from identical 
government interference.217 
The danger is heightened because the company worked so 
closely with government law enforcement while it was surveilling 
protesters. Media reports show that the company worked closely 
with law enforcement in at least five states in the course of 
responding to the anti-DAPL movement.218 In a leaked situation 
report, TigerSwan analysts highlight the reluctance of certain 
county law enforcement officials “‘to arrest or cite trespassing 
individuals’” and underscored a “‘need to work closer with Calhoun, 
Boone, and Webster county [law enforcement] to ensure future 
protestors will at least be fined, if not arrested.’”219 In essence, a 
private security company had the financial incentive to portray 
protesters as threatening and unpredictable in order to continue its 
contract,220 as well as the incentive to pressure the government to 
treat protesters more harshly in order to keep protesters from 
bothering their employer. It is a deeply troubling precedent to have 
a private entity—an entity trained in global intelligence and 
battleground tactics, whose analysts equate pipeline protesters to 
jihadists and work to divide them along racial lines, with financial 
incentive to portray protesters as threatening—working with 
government law enforcement to monitor and surveil protesters and 
water protectors as well as pressuring government actors to punish 
protesters more harshly. It is clear why the ACLU alleges that such 
coordinated collaboration between government and private security 
forces creates “undue scrutiny of political speech.”221 As conflict over 
pipelines continues in the U.S., it is likely that companies will 
continue to hire private security firms to respond to protesters. 
Protesters will likely have to face surveillance from private security 
firms and government officials working in tandem, in addition to 
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critical infrastructure bills that potentially give government 
prosecutors and lawmakers’ broader latitude to search, arrest, and 
charge them with dramatically heightened criminal and financial 
penalties. 
2. Use of Violence Against Water Protectors and 
Protesters 
As described above, water protectors and their allies faced a 
wave of violence during their resistance to the DAPL. The 
Indigenous Peoples Law and Policy Program at the University of 
Arizona Rogers College of Law prepared a Report for the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, which highlighted such 
violence. The Report found that, during the seven months between 
September 2016 and February 2017, there were at least seventy-six 
law enforcement agencies, federal agencies, and private security 
agencies present at the site of resistance against the DAPL 
pipeline.222 In September 2016, water protectors peacefully 
approached workers bulldozing sacred burial sites and attempted to 
pray and protect the sites.223 Industry security guards used attack 
dogs and pepper spray on the water protectors, injuring a number of 
Indigenous people, including a pregnant woman.224 Further, in 
October 2016, law enforcement descended on the camps, using “a 
Long Range Acoustic Device sound weapon, explosive teargas 
grenades, chemical agents, Tasers, rubber bullets, batons and a 
Directed Energy weapon” against non-violent water protectors.225 A 
Councilwoman for the Ponca Tribe of Oklahoma who was at the 
camps when law enforcement descended described the scene:  
Our people stood or sat in prayer. Some chanted, some sang, some 
observed and filmed the assault that happened. We were violently 
overcome. None of us were armed with anything more than our 
prayers and Sacred Pipes and Eagle Feather Staffs. Several of us 
were Elders of our Nations, 70 and above. Many were our Sacred 
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Youth. We were pepper sprayed in our faces, struck down, tazed, 
then hands zip-tied behind us, thrown to the ground and eventually 
142 of us were taken by bus to jail . . . .  
 
I'll always hold one image in my mind. When I had last seen my 
oldest son, he was being assaulted and dragged away by 5 police in 
riot gear because he was asking for the Elders to have the zip-ties 
removed or at least placed in front of our bodies. The next place I saw 
him was in the basement of that jail, he was injured and in a dog 
cage, but alive.226 
The Report documents several other examples of extreme 
violence used against peaceful water protectors at Standing Rock, 
including a November 2016 incident where over two-hundred people 
were injured.227 It also argues that, in many parts of the world, 
peaceful, Indigenous-led resistance is disproportionately met by 
violence.228 To support this proposition, the report highlights the 
stark difference in how law enforcement responded to the peaceful 
Indigenous-led resistance at Standing Rock and how it responded to 
the armed, unlawful resistance led by the Bundy family in Oregon 
and Nevada, pointing out the comparative lack of police presence and 
militarized response to the Bundy family and its anti-government 
militias.229  
3. Federal Lawmakers’ Push to Prosecute Protesters 
as Terrorists 
It is not just private security firms that view pipeline protesters 
as extremists. In an October 2017 letter to the U.S. Department of 
Justice, eighty–four federal lawmakers queried whether pipeline 
protesters could be prosecuted as domestic terrorists under the 
Patriot Act.230 Several months earlier, in May 2017, the American 
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Petroleum Institute had sent a letter to the Department of Justice 
citing the threat of environmental extremists and encouraging the 
Department to “renew the government’s commitment to . . . the 
importance of identifying, deterring, detecting, disrupting, and 
preparing for threats and hazards to our nation’s critical 
infrastructure.”231 Further, when the office of Representative Ken 
Buck sent around a letter addressed to the Department of Justice to 
his congressional colleagues to gather support for the October 2017 
query, the American Petroleum Institute was listed as a supporter of 
the official query along with the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and the 
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America.232 Additionally, after 
publication of Ken Buck’s October 2017 letter, the American 
Petroleum Institute released a statement of support for the letter, 
saying it was an important step in protecting against environmental 
extremists.233  
In his media comments regarding the letter, terrorism expert 
David Schanzer expressed skepticism that it would have legal 
consequences, but did think it “could be used for rhetorical value.”234 
That rhetorical power is underscored by research showing that, for 
more than fifteen years, Americans have consistently ranked 
terrorism as one of the top policy priorities for the federal 
government.235 Americans are extremely worried about terrorism 
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and want the government to protect them against the threat. The 
rhetorical force of framing protesters as extremists and terrorists has 
undoubtedly helped advance the wave of legislative proposals 
restricting climate protesters. When industry stakeholders pushed 
lawmakers to support the creation of an ALEC model critical 
infrastructure bill in December 2017, they pointed to several 
instances of explosive use and gunfire—which were not connected to 
protesters—to say the bill was necessary.236 The model bill has 
spurred state legislation that gives law enforcement broader latitude 
to search and arrest protesters, as well as to charge them with hefty 
penalties. As discussed previously, there is clear evidence that 
TigerSwan, a private security firm working closely with law 
enforcement, viewed water protectors and protesters as an extremist 
insurgency similar to jihadists. It is not hard to see how this 
rhetorical framing might contribute to government and private 
security’s militarized response to protesters.  
4. Social Media Surveillance of Climate Protesters 
Climate protesters also face the threat of their social media 
being surveilled, potentially undermining their First Amendment 
rights. An example from Washington state demonstrates how social 
media can be used to target and gather information on climate 
protesters. In February 2017, the Red Line Salish Sea, an 
Indigenous-led climate justice group, organized a protest against 
Trump’s executive orders and fossil fuel projects that blocked a 
highway for an hour in Whatcom County.237 Nobody was arrested, 
but there was a minor car accident tied to the slowing of traffic from 
the protest.238 The Whatcom County Prosecuting Attorney launched 
an investigation into the protest and served Facebook with a 
warrant, seeking “all messages, photos, videos, wall posts, and 
location information” connected to Red Line Salish Sea’s Facebook 
page.239 The first warrant application was withdrawn after the 
ACLU took legal action, and a second was withdrawn after objections 
 
236. Kaufman, supra note 136. 
237. Simon Davis-Cohen, The Justice Department Helped a County Prosecutor 








from Facebook, but a third warrant application was approved.240 The 
warrant forced Facebook to hand over all of the Facebook page 
content stored between February 5th, 2017 and February 15th, 
2017.241 This included administrative and moderator profiles, 
images and videos posted to the page, and event information—
including the account names and ID numbers for all users who were 
interested in, going to, or invited to the event.242 In its legal challenge 
to the first warrant application, the ACLU argued that granting 
sweeping warrants for the identifying information of those who 
engage in protected speech on social media would inevitably chill 
political speech and association.243 There is a clear risk of deterring 
protected speech and association if even those merely “interested” or 
“invited” to climate protests now risk having their Facebook account 
information shared with law enforcement over minor incidents 
connected to such protests.   
This section highlights the various avenues that government 
and industry stakeholders can take to monitor climate protesters. 
Private security forces are checking in on the political speech of 
university students far from protest sites, and prosecutors are 
requesting the social media information of even those most 
tangentially related to climate protests. It also shows how industry 
and government stakeholders are pushing to label protesters as 
terrorists and extremists, ultimately justifying legislation to make it 
easier to surveil protesters and potentially changing the way law 
enforcement confronts protesters. It is clear that law enforcement 
officials are prepared to use militarized and violent tactics to 
disperse water protectors and climate protesters.  
C. Retaliatory Lawsuits Against Climate Protesters 
The final tactic being used to target climate protesters is 
punitive lawsuits aimed at undermining lawful protest. Civil rights 
attorneys allege that fossil fuel industry members are attempting to 
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stifle the environmental activism of both individuals and 
organizations through Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation (SLAPPs).244 Some of the clearest examples of this 
tactic are the lawsuits filed by Energy Transfer, the parent 
companies of DAPL, against Greenpeace and other anti-DAPL 
movement members for hundreds of millions of dollars.245 One of 
Energy Transfer’s lawsuits alleged that Greenpeace and other 
activists violated the Racketeering Influence and Corrupt 
Organization (RICO) act.246 Non-profits argue that such allegations 
are particularly chilling to environmental speech and activism.247 In 
this section I will delve into the details of Energy Transfer’s lawsuits 
against Greenpeace and others, giving a brief introduction to the 
hallmarks and consequences of SLAPPs. Then I will discuss how 
using SLAPPs in conjunction with RICO allegations can be 
especially threatening to protesters. 
1. Energy Transfer’s Lawsuits Against Greenpeace 
and Others 
In August 2017, Energy Transfer Equity and Energy Transfer 
Partners, collectively called Energy Transfer, filed a $900 million 
dollar lawsuit in federal district court against Greenpeace, 
BankTrack, Earth First! and a collection of individuals in connection 
to their resistance to Energy Transfer’s DAPL.248 The complaint 
alleged that the defendants were a “network of putative not-for-
profits and rogue eco-terrorist groups who employ patterns of 
criminal activity and campaigns of misinformation to target 
legitimate companies and industries with fabricated environmental 
claims and other purported misconduct, inflicting billions of dollars 
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in damage.”249 More specifically, it alleged that the defendants had 
engaged in racketeering and conspiracy in contravention of the 
federal RICO Act, as well as engaging in racketeering in violation of 
state law, defamation, tortious interference with business, and 
common law civil conspiracy.250 Additionally, Energy Transfer’s 
complaint used the word “terrorist” 23 times in total, demonstrating 
how the fossil fuel industry has attempted to leverage another legal 
avenue to paint climate protesters as terrorists and extremists.251 
After a few procedural steps, including several defendants being 
dropped from the lawsuit, a federal judge ultimately granted the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss Energy Transfer’s lawsuit in 
February 2019.252 Energy Transfer’s federal RICO claims were 
dismissed with prejudice, but their state law claims were dismissed 
without prejudice.253 When reviewing a defendant’s motion to 
dismiss, a court accepts all factual allegations in the complaint as 
true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.254 
Even under that lenient standard, the court found that Energy 
Transfer had failed to establish plausible claims under RICO, often 
highlighting that the companies were not even close to establishing 
such claims.255 The court explained what Energy Transfer would 
have had to show to make a valid civil RICO claim: 
A valid civil RICO claim requires: “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) 
through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.”  So, Plaintiff must 
establish that an enterprise existed; each Defendant was associated 
with the enterprise; each Defendant participated in the conduct of 
the affairs of the enterprise; and each Defendant’s participation was 
through a pattern of racketeering activity.256  
The RICO Act was designed to target long-term criminal 
coordination like mob activity.257 In assessing Energy Transfer’s 
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RICO allegations step by step, the Court highlighted how the 
allegations fell far short of the criminal enterprise targeted by the 
RICO act. It wrote that, “'[d]onating to people whose cause you 
support does not create a RICO enterprise,” and “[p]osting articles 
written by people with similar beliefs does not create a RICO 
enterprise.”258 In assessing Energy Transfer’s allegations of mail and 
wire fraud, the Court wrote, “most (if not all) of the alleged ‘false and 
sensational claims’ are either subject to debate, matters of opinion, 
or inconsequential.”259 Although Energy Transfer was far from 
establishing the necessary RICO claims, it was able to hold the 
threat of a $900 million lawsuit over the defendants for almost two 
years. Below I will describe how the case had the hallmarks of a 
SLAPP and why SLAPPs can so effectively chill protected First 
Amendment activity.  
Just a week after Energy Transfer’s case was dismissed by a 
federal court in February 2019, the companies (plaintiffs) filed a new 
lawsuit in state court against the same organizations and 
individuals, with the addition of Red Warrior Society.260 Since the 
state law claims were dismissed from the federal court without 
prejudice, the companies brought the same or similar state claims 
against Greenpeace and the other defendants, as well as several new 
claims, in state court.261 The speed with which this second lawsuit 
was filed shows how difficult it is for non-profits and others to fight 
the various legal tactics being used to target climate protesters. 
Similar to Energy Transfer’s quick turnaround after being defeated 
in court, the South Dakota government was exploring new 
legislation to stifle climate protest just months after being forced into 
a settlement agreement by the ACLU’s constitutional challenge of its 
“riot-boosting” provisions.262 Litigation takes an immense amount of 
time, energy, and financial resources. Many non-profits and 
individual protesters cannot match the resources governments and 
industry members have at their disposal, making it difficult for those 
non-profits and individual protestors to outlast legal challenges 
brought against them.  
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There is another illuminating connection between the South 
Dakota litigation and the Energy Transfer litigation. Although the 
cases are very different in content and procedural posturing—one 
was a constitutional challenge to state legislation brought by a civil 
rights organization, and one was an industry lawsuit alleging 
various state and federal law infractions by individuals and 
organizations—federal courts in both cases highlighted how normal 
and lawful behavior of climate protesters is now at risk of sparking 
legal action. In temporarily enjoining provisions of South Dakota’s 
laws, the Court warned that “sending a[n] . . . email or a letter to the 
editor in support of a protest,” in addition to a long list of other 
pedestrian actions, could run afoul of the enjoined provisions.263 In 
dismissing Energy Transfer’s lawsuit against Greenpeace and other 
defendants, the Court wrote, “[p]osting articles written by people 
with similar beliefs does not create a RICO enterprise.”264 Such 
warnings give a sense of the broad scope of behavior, including 
merely sending a letter to the editor or posting an article, that may 
subject individual and organizational protesters to legal action, even 
if such action is later dismissed, enjoined, or overturned. The threat 
is particularly potent because of the ability of government and 
industry to leverage superior resources against protesters and any 
legal challenges they mount, as evidenced by how quickly South 
Dakota and Energy Transfer responded to their respective legal 
defeats. 
a. Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, or SLAPPs, 
are, at their core, lawsuits brought in retaliation for citizens’ 
attempts to influence the government or the wider electorate, which 
have the effect of reducing future public engagement in policy 
debates.265 George Pring, one of the leading scholars on SLAPPs, 
described four criteria to decide whether a lawsuit qualifies as a 
SLAPP, including whether the case is: 
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1. a civil complaint or counterclaim (for monetary damages 
and/or injunction),  
2. filed against non-governmental individuals and/or 
groups,  
3. because of their communications to a government body, 
official, or the electorate,  
4. on an issue of some public interest or concern.266 
 
Other scholars have suggested a fifth criterion, whether “the 
suits are without merit and contain an ulterior political or economic 
motive.”267 The criteria capture how SLAPPs transform disputes, 
allowing a politically and financially powerful stakeholder to 
unilaterally shift the forum of a debate and the issue being 
debated.268 George Pring draws from the work of Penelope Canan to 
describe this fundamental shifting of the debate: “[o]ne moment a 
citizen is testifying against a city zoning permit for a proposed 
housing subdivision; suddenly, ‘city hall’ becomes ‘courthouse,’ and 
‘zoning’ becomes ‘slander.’”269 The consequences of this kind of 
unilateral reframing of issues by powerful stakeholders can be 
devastating for social movements; Pring and Canan “saw committed, 
hardcharging activists become frightened into silence, supporters 
drop out, resources diverted, fund-raising wither, public-issue 
campaigns flounder, and community groups die.”270 Strikingly, the 
targets of SLAPPs rarely lose in court, but they are still 
“depoliticized—‘chilled’ in first amendment vernacular.”271 
Environmental activists have long been the target of SLAPP suits,272 
and activists warn that SLAPPs have become a key tactic in a global 
trend to stifle and intimidate environmental activists.273 
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Energy Transfer’s first lawsuit against Greenpeace and other 
defendants meets the criteria of a SLAPP suit. I will focus on the first 
lawsuit because it reached a final judicial determination, but the 
second lawsuit has similar features to the first.274 In its first lawsuit, 
Energy Transfer filed a civil complaint for massive money damages, 
potentially up to and beyond $900 million, against non-governmental 
groups and individuals. Energy Transfer’s complaint is rife with 
examples of the defendants’ communications to the electorate on an 
issue of public concern, and it uses those communications as the 
basis of its various allegations. For instance, in an attempt to 
demonstrate Greenpeace and others’ criminal enterprise activity, 
Energy Transfer alleged that the defendants: 
wrote a letter to the Equator Principles Association (“EPA”), a 
consortium of global banks committed to responsible environmental 
and social practices, alleging “astonish[ment]” that thirteen EPA 
banks were funding DAPL, which the letter described as a “climate 
destroying project[.]” The letter falsely asserted, among other things, 
that:   
 
DAPL “threatens air and water resources in the region and further 
downstream.”275 
The complaint also highlights what it sees as other key 
examples of the defendants’ schemes, alleging that they launched the 
#NODAPL Campaign, disseminated false claims about DAPL, 
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misrepresented that DAPL will catastrophically alter climate.276 
Such examples almost certainly suggest that the complaint was filed 
because of the defendants’ communications to the electorate on an 
issue of public concern—how the Dakota Access Pipeline would affect 
climate change, water, and Indigenous sovereignty. As discussed 
above, the Court found that these communications fell far short of 
establishing the claimed infractions,277 emphasizing that posting 
articles and donating money do not establish racketeering activity. 
The communications also fit squarely within the constitutional 
category of political speech and are thus supposed to be subject to the 
highest level of protection from government action. It is clear to see 
how a $900 million dollar lawsuit that explicitly targeted the political 
speech of non-profits and individual protesters and lasted a year and 
a half before it was dismissed, only to immediately be followed by a 
similar suit, could have the exact First Amendment chilling effects 
that Pring and Canan warned about. 
In addition to bearing the hallmarks of a SLAPP suit, Energy 
Transfer’s lawsuit also alleged that the defendants violated RICO, 
an allegation that can deter protesters and organizations in unique 
ways. By making RICO allegations, industry stakeholders can frame 
activists as criminal enterprises, thereby supporting the terrorist or 
extremist framing that has been used against climate protesters.278 
Civil rights and environmental organizations expanded on the 
unique threat of RICO allegations in an amicus brief they submitted 
in support of defendants’ motions to dismiss Energy Transfer’s first 
lawsuit. They pointed to case law describing a RICO allegation as 
“the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device,” explaining that 
non-profits are particularly vulnerable to such allegations because of 
their limited financial capacity and dependence on a positive public 
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reputation.279 RICO claims carry the risk of treble damages, can be 
resource-intensive to defend in court, and create strong financial 
incentives for organizations not to appeal potential losses at the 
district court level. Such claims have the potential to transform the 
most constitutionally protected speech into federal crimes like mail 
fraud, wire fraud, and extortion.280 Thus, SLAPP suits and RICO 
allegations are a dangerous combination. SLAPPs retaliate against 
those who engage in public discourse, discouraging future public 
participation in devastating ways; but SLAPPs that utilize RICO 
allegations retaliate against public participation and political speech 
by framing such actions as criminal activity, thereby heightening the 
potential to undermine constitutionally protected activity. Energy 
Transfer’s lawsuits also underscore that it is not just individuals who 
face an industry-driven pattern of tactics to stifle or chill their 
participation in climate protest. Organizations and non-profits also 
face the triple threat of collective liability provisions in critical 
infrastructure bills, SLAPP suits, and RICO allegations, all of which 
attempt to hold them vicariously liable for the actions of other 
protesters.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
At the very moment when the UN has called for profound shifts 
in social and economic systems to avert climate catastrophe,281 
governments around the world are targeting protesters advocating 
for climate action. The U.S. is a key part of this trend; federal and 
state government stakeholders have moved to stifle protest more 
generally, and climate protest in particular. Although such actions 
often ostensibly target civil disobedience, by imposing immense 
criminal and financial consequences, they threaten to 
unconstitutionally chill lawful, protected protest as well. Building off 
of the First Amendment’s heightened protection for political 
expression, the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated a robust, but not 
unlimited, right to protest. Although not protected under the First 
Amendment, civil disobedience has played a long and storied role in 
advancing justice in the U.S., and there are strong arguments 
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against imposing draconian penalties on climate civil disobedients, 
particularly considering how much the fossil fuel industry has 
undermined effective legal avenues for citizens to engage in the 
climate policy debate. Although the move to stifle climate protesters 
is often framed as a government effort, it is critical to draw out the 
role of industry in initiating, amplifying, or supporting such tactics. 
In this article, I grouped tactics into three broad categories: federal 
and state critical infrastructure legislation; violence against and 
surveillance of protesters, including a rhetorical and legal push to 
label protesters as terrorists and extremists; and retaliatory 
lawsuits. I also provided a brief description of the anti-DAPL 
movement, which has been identified as one of the key catalysts in 
the government and industry push to target climate protesters. 
Interesting patterns and insights emerge from analyzing these 
three trends in conjunction with one another and drawing out the 
role of industry in each. The first, and most obvious, is that when 
looking at the trends together, it is much easier to see how both 
individual protesters and organizations that support protesters 
might be deterred from participating in lawful climate protest. 
Individual protesters potentially face the combined threat of newly 
broadened critical infrastructure definitions—which can make it 
difficult to recognize the line between lawful and unlawful protest—
massive criminal and financial penalties for accidentally or 
purposefully engaging in unlawful protest, retaliatory industry 
lawsuits for hundreds of millions of dollars, and comprehensive and 
invasive surveillance of constitutionally protected expressive 
activity. Additionally, they may have to contend with militarized law 
enforcement, working in conjunction with private security forces who 
view protesters as extremist insurgencies, in an atmosphere in which 
they know industry and government officials are pushing to label 
them as terrorists. Non-profits and civil society groups, even those 
with official policies against civil disobedience, are facing their own 
risks when they engage in constitutionally protected speech. The 
triple threat of collective liability provisions in critical infrastructure 
bills, SLAPP suits, and RICO allegations, all of which attempt to 
hold organizations vicariously liable for the actions of other 
protesters, can make organizations think twice about participating 
in or supporting climate protests. Of course, protesters will not 
always face all of the tactics in conjunction. However, water 




surveillance, violence, being labelled terrorists and extremists, and 
retaliatory lawsuits. Many of the states affected by the anti-DAPL 
movement successfully passed critical infrastructure bills, and states 
gearing up for large protests against Keystone XL, like South 
Dakota, have passed or proposed their own critical infrastructure 
bills. Thus, given the government and industry response to the anti-
DAPL movement, it seems likely that these same stakeholders will 
attempt to utilize every tactic possible to target climate protesters 
when larger, sustained climate protests occur. 
A second, related insight that emerges from this analysis is that 
there are important synergistic effects when these tactics are used 
together, heightening their power to undermine and chill climate 
protest. For example, critical infrastructure provisions framed in 
terms of conspiracy, which only requires that conspirators take steps 
towards an unlawful act rather than committing an unlawful act, 
give law enforcement broader latitude to surveil and arrest 
protesters. As demonstrated by the DAPL resistance, water 
protectors and protesters are already facing invasive monitoring and 
surveillance from private security forces working in conjunction with 
government law enforcement. The rhetorical push by government 
lawmakers and fossil fuel industry stakeholders to cast protesters as 
terrorists and extremists has eased the passage of critical 
infrastructure provisions imposing draconian penalties on violators, 
which in turn have made it easier for lawmakers to surveil and arrest 
protesters. Such framing also affects how law enforcement engages 
with protesters, potentially making them more likely to surveil, 
arrest, and use violence against protesters. Industry SLAPP suits 
echo that terrorist language, framing non-profits that support 
climate protests as criminal enterprises. Such public framing can 
help justify collective liability provisions in critical infrastructure 
bills that hold organizations vicariously liable for the actions of other 
protesters. 
A third insight is the difficulty that climate protesters face in 
challenging these tactics. Climate protesters have won two legal 
victories against tactics targeting their protest after diverting time 
and resources to the challenges, only to see government or industry 
stakeholders immediately try again with similar tactics. Just 
months after the South Dakota government reached a settlement 
agreement stating it would never enforce the provisions of its critical 




constitution, the government proposed new changes to the laws. 
Similarly, just a week after Greenpeace and other defendants had 
Energy Transfer’s $900 million federal lawsuit dismissed, the 
companies refiled a similar suit in state court.  
A fourth and final insight that emerges from this article is the 
pivotal role of fossil fuel industry trade and lobbying groups in 
creating, supporting, and amplifying various tactics to target climate 
protesters. The involvement of these groups demonstrates the 
breadth of fossil fuel industry support for such tactics. Fossil fuel 
trade and lobbying groups, like the American Petroleum Institute, 
also serve as a key link between the push to stifle climate protesters 
and the drive to undermine climate science for decades.282 Evidence 
of their support shows that the same actors, representing broad 
swathes of the fossil fuel industry, have been deeply involved in both 
strategies.  
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